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1Abstract
In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that
explains why ‡ows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Eu-
rope compared to North America, while employment-to-employment ‡ows
are similar in the two continents. In the model, …rms use discretion in
terms of whom to …re and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be
dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and …ring costs
increase, …rms …nd it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer
to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool
of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be ‘lemons’. We use
microdata for Spain and the U.S. and …nd that the ratio of the job …nding
probability of the unemployed to the job …nding probability of employed job
seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S.. Furthermore, using U.S.
data, we …nd that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the
1980’s in those states that raised …ring costs by introducing exceptions to
the employment-at-will doctrine.
Keywords: Adverse Selection, Turnover Costs, Unemployment, Worker
Flows, Matching Models, Discrimination.
Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Codes: E24, J41,
J63, J64, J65, J71.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Worker ‡ows between employment and unemployment provide a picture of
rigid labor markets in Europe compared to North America. Both the in‡ow
and out‡ow rates from unemployment are much lower in Europe than in
North America.1 In contrast, employment-to-employment ‡ows appear to
be quite similar in the two continents, indicating more dynamism in European
labor markets than is often inferred from looking only at ‡ows into and out
of unemployment.2
Our paper contributes to explaining the large di¤erences between the
‡ows into and out of unemployment but similar employment-to-employment
‡ows in North America and Europe by linking this pattern of ‡ows to la-
bor market institutions. We present a model of adverse selection, in which
hiring and …ring costs reduce the hiring of both unemployed and employed
job seekers, but in which the hiring of the former is more sensitive to in-
creases in turnover costs than that of the latter. The matching model with
adverse selection presented in this paper shows that being exposed to unem-
ployment stigmatizes workers because, absent other signals, …rms infer that
unemployed workers are of lower quality. To the extent that wages move
less than one to one with worker productivity, which is the case for most
models of non-competitive wage formation, jobs held by high ability workers
generate higher pro…ts for the …rm than jobs held by low ability workers.
Consequently, when the …rm faces a bad shock, the latter are more likely
to be dismissed than the former. The market, thus, infers that the aver-
1The in‡ow rates are 2.1% and 1.8% and the out‡ow rates are 37% and 23% in the
U.S. and Canada, respectively. These in‡ow and out‡ow rates compare to 0.6% and 2%
in Spain, 0.4% and 6% in Italy, 0.3% and 4% in France, 0.2% and 6% in the Netherlands,
0.6% and 9% in Germany, 0.2% and 19% in Portugal, 1.7% and 18% in Denmark, 0.4%
and 10% in Belgium and 0.7% and 10% in the U.K. (OECD, 1995). In fact, it is these
very large di¤erences in out‡ow rates which are very important in explaining the incidence
of long-term unemployment in Europe compared to North America. The shares of the
long-term unemployed (de…ned as those unemployed for more than a year) are 50.1% in
Spain, 57.7% in Italy, 34.2% in France, 52.3% in the Netherlands, 40.3% in Germany,
43.4% in Portugal, 25.2% in Denmark, 52.9% in Belgium, and 42.5% in the U.K.. In
contrast, the long-term unemployed account for only 11.7% and 14.1% of all unemployed
workers in the U.S. and Canada, respectively (OECD, 1995).
2Yearly employment-to-employment ‡ows as a percentage of total employment are
18.4% in Spain, 6.2% in Italy, 8.7% in France, 11.6% in the Netherlands, 11.4% in Ger-
many, 15.8% in Portugal, 13.3% in Denmark, 9.5% in Belgium, 10.2% in the U.K., and
12.6% in Canada (Boeri, 1999).
3age quality of the unemployed is lower than the average quality of employed
workers and, at the time of hiring, …rms prefer to hire an employed job seeker
rather than an unemployed one. The cost to the …rm of having to regret its
hiring choice because worker quality turns out to be too low is greater, the
greater are hiring and …ring costs. This is essentially an option value e¤ect.
Consequently, discrimination against unemployed job seekers is likely to be
increasing in turnover costs. In the extreme case where hiring and …ring
costs are zero, …rms always have the option of hiring a worker to observe
his quality and getting rid of him if he turns out to be inadequate. In our
model, we measure discrimination against the unemployed as the inverse of
the ratio between the job …nding rate of an unemployed job seeker and that
of an employed one. We show that this ratio is typically decreasing with
turnover costs, i.e., discrimination increases with hiring and …ring costs.
In addition to their option value e¤ect, turnover costs also have an e¤ect
on the composition of the in‡ow into unemployment. An increase in …ring
costs reduces the in‡ow of both good and bad workers into unemployment.
If, at the margin, the in‡ow of bad workers is reduced more than that of
good workers, then this composition e¤ect tends to improve the quality of
the pool of unemployed job seekers, and to reduce discrimination against the
unemployed. In that case, the net e¤ect of …ring costs on discrimination
is ambiguous. In the opposite case, the composition e¤ect reinforces the
option value e¤ect and …ring costs unambiguously increase discrimination
against the unemployed. We show that, under reasonable assumptions about
the distribution of …rm-speci…c productivity shocks, this is indeed the case.
Moreover, we show that the composition e¤ects of turnover costs have the
opposite sign from those of other labor costs.
This model helps to explain the functioning of European and North Amer-
ican labor markets. In North America, low …ring costs make …rms less likely
to discriminate between employed and unemployed job seekers. This is con-
sistent with the high ‡ows into and out of unemployment in North America.
In Europe, where hiring and …ring costs are high, …rms use employment
status as a signal of worker quality and they prefer hiring employed job seek-
ers instead of the unemployed. This is consistent with our evidence from
microdata for the U.S. and Spain, the two OECD countries with the least
and most strict job-security provisions. Our results indicate that, control-
ling for a number of characteristics, discrimination against the unemployed
is stronger in Spain than in the U.S.. Moreover, we use the temporal vari-
ation in job-security provisions in the U.S., together with the variation in
4legislative changes across states, to examine how the relative job …nding
probabilities of the unemployed changed as …ring costs increased in the U.S.
over the 1980’s. We …nd that discrimination increased over the 1980’s in the
U.S. in those states that raised …ring costs by introducing exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
related literature. In Section 3, we present and solve the matching model
with asymmetric information. In Section 4, we contrast the comparative
statics of the discrimination of the unemployed with respect to hiring and
…ring costs and with respect to wages. In Section 5, we present empirical ev-
idence on the relation between hiring and …ring costs and the discrimination
of the unemployed described above. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Related Literature
Our model contributes to the growing literature on the role of information
asymmetries in the labor market. Previous papers that have studied the
implications of private information by current employers vis-a-vis the market
include Greenwald (1986), Gibbons and Katz (1991), Montgomery (1999),
and Canziani and Petrongolo (1999).
Greenwald (1986) and Gibbons and Katz (1991) explore the implications
for wages of private information by current employers about their employees’
ability. In Greenwald’s model, current employers with private information
would focus on retaining ‘good’ workers. Thus, workers willing to move
signal lower ability and future employers are only willing to hire them at
lower wages. Instead of focusing attention on the branding e¤ect faced by
job-changers, Gibbons and Katz (1991) concentrate on the signal obtained by
the market when workers are laid-o¤. Since being displaced by plant-closings
provides no signal to prospective employers, Gibbons and Katz (1991) claim
that these workers should su¤er smaller wage losses than laid-o¤ workers.
They, then, present empirical evidence showing that, indeed, laid-o¤ workers
su¤er greater wage losses and endure longer spells of unemployment than
equivalent workers displaced by plant-closings. Our work is complementary
to these papers, but it di¤ers in that we focus on the role of institutions and
the implications of adverse selection on labor ‡ows. Moreover, while Gibbons
and Katz (1991) contrasts the experience of laid-o¤ workers with that of
workers displaced by plant closings, this paper contrasts the experience of
5job-to-job switchers with that of workers going through unemployment.
Montgomery (1999) and Canziani and Petrongolo (1999) are closer to
our paper. Both present search models with asymmetric information and
explore the role of turnover costs. As in Greenwald (1986) and Gibbons and
Katz (1991), in these papers current employers have better information about
workers than prospective employers. Prospective employers, thus, expect
the pool of the unemployed to be of lower quality and this reduces …rms’
incentives to hire. Our paper di¤ers from these papers in that their focus is
solely on the unemployed, while in our paper we explore the consequences
of adverse selection on the unemployed’s job …nding probability relative to
employed job seekers and more generally on worker ‡ows.
While the paper by Levine (1991) does not concentrate on the role of pri-
vate information by current employers , it considers asymmetric information
between …rms and workers when there are job-security provisions and shows
that it may be optimal to introduce just-cause employment policies when
there is adverse selection. According to Levine (1991), …rms may not have
an incentive to introduce just-cause individually, because they may attract a
disproportionate share of ‘lemons’. Thus, in Levine’s paper, …rms applying
just-cause employment policies individually generate positive externalities on
other …rms and they may be reluctant to adopt them, although society may
bene…t. In contrast to Levine (1991), in our paper just-cause employment
policies generate negative externalities on other …rms since current employers
hug the ‘good’ workers.
This paper also relates to the extensive literature that examines the link
between …ring costs and labor market performance. Unlike standard models
of …ring costs, however, our model can explain why the ratio of employment-
to-employment ‡ows to unemployment-to-employment ‡ows is greater in Eu-
rope than in North America. Our model, thus, complements Bertola and
Rogerson (1997) and Boeri (1999), which provide alternative models to ex-
plain why similar job reallocation in the two continents takes the form of
job-to-job ‡ows in Europe and of ‡ows into and out of unemployment in
North America.3
3Bertola and Rogerson (1997) solve this puzzle by showing that if higher …ring costs are
accompanied by greater wage compression, this would tend to increase gross job turnover.
They argue, however, that countries with stricter job security provisions would have lower
‡ows into and out of unemployment because advance notice allows the better workers to
…nd a new job before being displaced while the rest would have to pass through unem-
ployment. Boeri (1999), instead, argues that high job turnover in Europe is consistent
63 The Model
In the model presented in this Section, …rms use discretion in terms of whom
t o… r ea n d ,t h u s ,l o wq u a l i t yw o r k e r sa r em o r el i k e l yt ob ed i s m i s s e dt h a n
high quality workers. Therefore, the proportion of low quality workers is
greater among the unemployed than among the employed, and prospective
employers know it.
The model we present is based on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), where,
on the one hand, we have simpli…ed some aspects to preserve analytical
tractability, and, on the other hand, we have introduced dismissal costs and
imperfect observability of worker quality in order to capture the phenomena
discussed in the introduction.
3.1 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions with regards to the information struc-
ture, the matching process, the production technology, …ring costs and wages.
3.1.1 The Information Structure
The total labor force is normalized to one and split between two types of
workers, ‘good’ and ‘bad’. The proportion of ‘good’ workers is denoted by
z: Prior to hiring, …rms do not observe the quality of applicants, nor do they
observe their past labor history. The only thing they observe is whether the
applicant is currently employed or not. Immediately after hiring, however,
…rms observe the productivity of a worker.4 We assume that the productivity
of ‘good’ workers is ´ = ´H a n dt h a to f‘ b a d ’w o r k e r s´ = ´L <´ H:
3.1.2 The Matching Process
Workers are matched to …rms and together they produce output. This
matching process takes time. A job seeker meets a vacant job with probabil-
with low unemployment turnover, because many worker ‡ows are shifts from job-to-job
by workers holding temporary jobs who compete with the unemployed.
4This assumption is not meant to be realistic, but is simply made for convenience, as
it reduces the number of individual states one has to keep track of. Ideally, one should
specify a learning process about the worker’s productivity as in the papers by Jovanovic
(1979a, 1979b). However, given that we are not dealing with learning aspects, we keep
that part of the model as simple as possible.
7ity a per unit of time, while a position meets a worker with ‡ow probability
¸. For simplicity, we assume that a is exogenous, which corresponds to a
matching function linear in the number of job seekers. If n is the total num-
ber of job seekers and v is the stock of vacancies, we then have m(n;v)=m0n
meetings per unit of time, so that a =
m(n;v)
n = m0; while ¸ =
m0n
v .A m o r e
general matching function would yield a negative relationship between ¸ and
a; while here that relationship boils down to a constant value of a:
3.1.3 Entry and Production
Firms freely enter the market by creating vacant positions. There is a …xed
setup cost of creating a position equal to C: Because of free entry, the value
of an empty position must always be equal to C in equilibrium.
Once a position is …lled, production takes place. The …rm’s output is
m+´; where m is a …rm-speci…c component and ´ is worker-speci…c. When
the match is initially formed, the …rm-speci…c component is equal to ¹ m:
Then, with probability ° per unit of time the …rm is subjected to a shock
such that the productivity of the …rm changes. Every time such a shock
occurs, the new productivity is drawn from a distribution over the interval
[m
¡; ¹ m]: We denote by G(m) the cumulative density function and by g(m) its
derivative.5
3.1.4 Firing Costs
Production takes place until either the …rm decides to close the position or
the worker quits voluntarily. When hit by a shock, …rms can decide to …re
the worker, in which case they have to pay a tax F: This tax is dissipated,
i.e. paid to a third party. When a …rm decides to …re, the position is closed
and the …rm’s value drops to zero. Moreover, production may also end when
workers quit voluntarily. A fraction ¼ of workers are constantly looking for
another job. The day they leave to another job, the position becomes vacant
and its value falls back to C: In addition, in the case of voluntary quits …rms
do not have to pay the tax, F:
5New matches, thus, start at the highest possible productivity level as in Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994).
83.1.5 Wages
Workers are paid a …xed wage w: More generally, it could also re‡ect their
quality as well as the …rm-speci…c component m: What really matters is
that …rms make higher pro…ts out of ‘good’ workers than out of ‘bad’ ones.
In order to solve for the model, we …rst characterize the …rm’s …ring
decisions given the exogenous idiosyncratic shocks and the quality of workers.
Then, given the …ring rules, we determine the …rms’ entry decisions and their
decisions of whether to hire employed and unemployed applicants. We always
limit ourselves to steady states.
3.2 Firing Decisions
Let J(m;´) be the value to the …rm of a job with worker-speci…c productivity
´ and …rm-speci…c productivity m: Given that the residual value of …ring the
worker is zero, the …rm will get rid of him whenever it is in a situation such
that J(m;´) < ¡F:
Then, J(m;´) evolves according to the following Bellman equation,
rJ(m;´)=( m+´¡w)+¼a(C¡J(m;´))+° [Em0 maxfJ(m
0;´);¡Fg¡J(m;´)]:
(1)
The second term of the RHS of (1) is the expected capital loss experienced
by the …rm if the worker quits, which happens with probability ¼a per unit
of time. The last term is the expected capital gain associated with the next
productivity shock, which shifts the value of m to m0:
Clearly, …ring will take place if and only if m is lower than some critical
value, which we call mc(´): If J(m;´) < ¡F then mc(´) is interior and
satis…es J(mc(´);´)=¡F,o t h e r w i s emc(´)=m. The probability of …ring
a worker with quality ´, conditional on having just being hit by a shock, is,
thus, G(mc(´)): Therefore, we have,
Em0 maxfJ(m











mc(´) (m0 + ´ ¡ w + ¼aC)g(m0)dm0 ¡ (r + ¼a+ °)FG(mc)
r + ¼a+ °G(mc)
:
(2)
9Substituting this formula into equation (1) and computing it at m =
mc(´); we get an equation that determines the optimal …ring point mc(´);6
¡F =
(r + ¼a+ °G(mc(´))(mc(´)+´ ¡ w + ¼aC)




mc(´) (m0 + ´ ¡ w + ¼aC)g(m0)dm0
(r + ¼a)(r + ¼a+ °)
: (4)
PROPOSITION 1 - Assume equation (4) holds. Then the …ring mar-
gin, mc(´); that triggers the …rm to …re a worker of quality ´ is determined
uniquely. Furthermore, mc is falling with ´; falling with F; falling with C
and increasing with w: M o r e o v e r ,t h e… r i n gm a r g i no fg o o dw o r k e r si sm o r e





















































Equation (3) determines the …ring points mc(´H) and mc(´L) as a direct
function of the model’s exogenous parameters. The greater sensitivity of the
…ring margin of good workers than of bad workers’ with respect to changes
in parameters comes from a discount e¤ect. Because good workers are less
likely to be …red, the pro…ts they generate are discounted less heavily, so
that their employment is more sensitive to changes in parameters.
6One can check that the critical value of m for both types of workers is interior if and
only if:
¡F<
¡´H + w ¡ ¼aC)
(r + ¼a)
¡
(r + ¼a)m + °
R ¹ m
m m0g(m0)dm0
(r + ¼a)(r + ¼a+ °)
; (3)
an assumption that we shall make since this is the only case of interest.
103.3 Hiring Decisions
We now compute the hiring decision of a …rm faced with an applicant. The
quality of the applicant is unobservable, but his status is observable and
provides a signal to the …rm. Let ze, respectively zu; be the proportion of
good workers among employed, respectively unemployed, job seekers. Then,
the expected present discounted values associated with hiring an employed
and an unemployed job seeker are,
¦e = zeJ(¹ m;´H)+( 1¡ ze)J(¹ m;´L);
¦u = zuJ(¹ m;´H)+( 1¡ zu)J(¹ m;´L):
One should note that J is increasing with ´; while ze must be greater
than zu; since as shown in Proposition 1 bad workers lose their jobs more
often, i.e., G(mc(´L)) >G (mc(´H)).C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
¦e ¡ ¦u =( ze ¡ zu)(J(¹ m;´H) ¡ J(¹ m;´L)) > 0= ) ¦e > ¦u:
As the average quality of employed workers is better, …rms prefer to hire
an employed applicant rather than an unemployed one. The …rm will decide
to hire the worker whenever ¦i >C ;it will not hire him if ¦i <C ;and it
is indi¤erent if ¦i = C: Furthermore, in any reasonable steady state, some
unemployed workers must be hired, otherwise unemployment will end up
being equal to 100 % as long as there is some job destruction. Consequently,
we must have ¦u ¸ C and we must, thus, distinguish between two regimes:
Regime 1 - If ¦e > ¦u >C ;then all employed and unemployed applicants
are hired.
Regime 2 - If ¦e > ¦u = C; then all employed applicants are hired,
while unemployed applicants are only hired with probability pu: There is
discrimination against unemployed applicants.7
7The lower hiring rate of the unemployed relative to employed workers re‡ects statistical
discrimination against the unemployed, because …rms use information about the average
characteristics of this group and the group of employed job seekers to make their hiring
decisions. In particular, …rms use employment status as an imperfect predictor of actual
productivity. For this reason, …rms may fail to hire ‘good’ workers belonging to the pool
of the unemployed, but they may end up hiring ‘bad’ workers belonging to the pool of
employed job seekers.
11It is regime 2 which is of interest to us. In that regime, the quality of
the unemployed zu is pinned down by the requirement that ¦u = C:
It is useful to represent the hiring behavior in the (pu;z u) plane. There
exists a unique value of zu such that ¦u = C: This de…nes a horizontal line
PP. Above that line, we have ¦u >C ;implying that unemployed applicants
are always hired, and we are in regime 1. Below that line we have ¦u <C ;
so that pu =0 . Consequently, the economy must lie on the EB (economic
behavior) locus as illustrated in Figure 1, although, as argued above, the
vertical portion pu =0is of little interest, since it is associated with a 100%
unemployment. The following Proposition shows the derivation of the EB
locus.
PROPOSITION 2 - The optimal hiring behavior of the unemployed
is given by a vertical portion at pu =0for ¦u <C ;a ‡at line at a unique
zu that satis…es ¦u = C, and a vertical portion at pu =1for ¦u >C :
In regime 2, any parameter change that reduces pro…ts increases the re-
quired quality for the unemployed to be hired. In particular, economic
behavior requires for the quality of the unemployed to increase when labor
costs increase in order for the pro…ts out of an unemployed applicant to
continue to cover the hiring costs. Proposition 3 proves this formally.
PROPOSITION 3 - The EB curve shifts upwards whenever F; C; or w
increase.
Thus, an increase in labor costs increases the required average quality of
the unemployed. As we shall see below, in equilibrium these shifts must also
be associated with greater discrimination against the unemployed, i.e., a fall
in pu:
3.4 Entry Decisions
Finally, the entry decision of …rms determines the number of vacant jobs.
The value of a vacant job V satis…es,
rV = ¸e(¦e ¡ C)+¸upu(¦u ¡ C) (5)
where ¸e and ¸u are the arrival rates of employed and unemployed job seekers,
respectively. In equilibrium there are u unemployed workers and ¼(1 ¡ u)









while ¸u = au=v: In regime 2 the above equation boils down to,
rV = ¸e(¦e ¡ C); (6)
12since ¦u = C:
In equilibrium one must have V = C:8 T h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o nt h e r e f o r e
determines the vacancy rate v: Given the linearity of the matching function,
it does not play any role in the rest of the analysis. Therefore, we can ignore
equations (5) and (6), which simply determine v once the other endogenous
variables have been solved for.9
3.5 Steady State Analysis
In the previous Section, we derived a relationship between pu and zu based
on the economic behavior of …rms. The joint determination of pu and zu is
then completed by deriving a steady state relationship between the two. In
steady state in‡ows into unemployment must be equal to out‡ows for each
group of workers. The two steady state conditions for good and bad workers
are,
°GHze(1 ¡ u)=apuuzu; (7)
°GL(1 ¡ ze)(1 ¡ u)=apuu(1 ¡ zu): (8)
The left hand side of equation (7) is the in‡ow into unemployment for
good workers. It is equal to the product of the arrival rate for shocks, °;times
the probability of a good worker losing his job if his …rm is hit by a shock,
GH = G(mc(´H)),t i m e st h en u m b e ro fg o o de m p l o y e dw o r k e r s ,ze(1 ¡ u):
The right hand side is the out‡ow of good workers out of unemployment. It
is equal to the product of the probability of …nding an employer, a; times the
probability of being hired if such an employer has been found, pu; times the
number of good unemployed workers, uzu: A similar interpretation holds for
equation (8), which applies to bad workers.
8If V> C ;then, …rms create more vacancies up to the point where the arrival rate of
applicants has fallen to bring down V back to C: If V< C ; vacancies are destroyed which
increases the application rate of remaining vacancies, up to the point where the inequality
is restored.
9 In the case where the economy is in Regime 2, for instance, we get:
v =
¼a(1 ¡ u)[zeJ(¹ m;´H)+( 1¡ ze)J(¹ m;´L)] ¡ C
rC
:
13Finally, there must be a relationship between ze;z u; and u for the equilib-
rium to be consistent with the distribution of worker types in the workforce:
zuu + ze(1 ¡ u)=z (9)
Equation (9) tells us that the sum of employed and unemployed good
workers, must be equal to their total number, z: Equilibrium is then deter-
mined by conditions (3), equations (7)-(9), and the conditions pu =1and
(5) or ¦u = C and (6); depending on whether we are in regime 1 or regime
2: These are seven equations which determine the endogenous variables
mc(´H);m c(´L);z u;z e;p u;u;and v:
Eliminating ze and u in (7)-(9) allows us to derive a steady state relation-
ship that must hold between pu and zu:
zu = z
° + apu=GL
° +( z=GL +( 1¡ z)=GH)apu
: (10)
This equation determines the steady state (S-S) locus, which provides a
condition between pu and zu; such that the composition of employment and
unemployment remains time invariant. Proposition 4 shows that the S-S
l o c u si sd o w n w a r ds l o p i n g .
PROPOSITION 4 - Equation (11) determines a downward sloping
steady state (S-S) locus in (pu;z u) space:
Why is S-S downward sloping? It implies that the more choosy employers
are (the lower pu), the better the quality of the unemployed in steady state.
This is because a lower exit from unemployment makes the steady state
composition of the unemployment pool more similar to its source population
- the employed. In the extreme case where pu =0 ; no unemployed worker
ever …nds a job, and eventually all the employed end up on the dole, including
all of the good ones. Thus, the economy ends up in a situation where the
whole workforce is unemployed, and zu is equal to its maximum value, z:
The equilibrium is determined by the point where the S-S curve crosses
the EB curve. Thus, which regime prevails depends on whether the S-S
locus cuts the EB locus along its horizontal or vertical portions. In the
…rst case, then the equilibrium is as in Figure 2.a. Firms are less willing
to hire unemployed applicants than employed ones. If S-S cuts EB above
its horizontal portion PP, however, then as shown in Figure 2.b …rms do not
discriminate against the unemployed, i.e., pu =1 . Finally, if S-S starts below
PP, then pu =0 , and all workers are unemployed (Figure 2.c). We assume
that the ´’s are large enough to rule out this uninteresting situation.
144 Labor Costs and Discrimination of the Un-
employed
In this section, we perform some comparative statics exercises to examine
how discrimination against the unemployed responds to changes in hiring
and …ring costs as well as wages. In the previous Section we showed that
bad workers are …red more often than good workers and, thus, the pool of
the unemployed is disproportionately composed of ‘lemons’. For this reason,
…rms use employment status as a signal of quality and are more reluctant
to hire unemployed applicants compared to employed ones. In this Section,
we show that higher turnover costs exacerbate the discrimination against the
unemployed, while large reductions of hiring and …ring costs may completely
eliminate discrimination. The reason for this is that if hiring and …ring costs
are nil, …rms can always hire workers to sample their quality and …re them
at no cost. In contrast, when hiring and …ring costs are high, …rms are
reluctant to hire unemployed workers who are more likely to turn out to be
‘lemons’ and, thus, to have to be …red eventually when hit by a shock. As
shown in this Section, however, the impact of turnover costs on discrimination
contrasts with the impact of wages.
4.1 Comparative Statics of Hiring and Firing Costs
We start with the comparative statics with respect to turnover costs, C and
F: As proved in Proposition 3, increases in C and F shift the EB curve
upwards. As Figure 2.a makes clear, if the S-S locus did not move, pu would
fall. However, the S-S locus does move, because increases in C and F a¤ect
the …ring margins mc(´H) and mc(´L) and, consequently, the composition
of the in‡ow into unemployment. Both the in‡ow of good workers and the
in‡ow of bad workers are reduced. If the latter were reduced more than the
former, then the quality of the unemployed would increase. The S-S locus
w o u l dt h e nm o v eu pa n dw h i l ezu would unambiguously increase, pu might
either rise or fall. That is, higher …ring costs make …rms more choosy but
also improve the quality of job losers so that discrimination need not rise.
Whether this occurs or not clearly depends on the local density of good and
bad workers around the …ring margins. However, we can prove that, under
reasonable conditions, the S-S curve actually shifts downwards, so that an
increase in F unambiguously reduces pu:




is nonincreasing with m;
the S-S locus moves down when the hiring and …ring costs, C and F;
increase.
Proposition 5 tells us that an increase in turnover costs lowers the quality
of the unemployed, given …rm’s hiring policies. This is because the job loss
rate falls more for good than for bad workers. This comes from two e¤ects.
First, as we saw in Proposition 1, the …ring margin for good workers is more
sensitive to F and C than the …ring margin for bad workers, because of the
lower discounting of the option value. Second, if the nonincreasing hazards
assumption holds, a given change in the …ring margin has a greater relative
e¤ect on the number of people being …red, the lower that number of people.
Since fewer good workers are …red, their …ring rate then falls proportionately
more than for bad workers, which reduces the average quality of job losers.
Of course, the nonincreasing hazards assumption need not hold, but it holds
for a wide range of distributions, including the uniform distribution and any
distribution that does not have an accentuated interior mode.
Figure 3 shows how the hiring rate of the unemployed changes when F
and C increase, under the nonincreasing hazards assumption. In this case,
higher turnover costs exacerbate discrimination in hiring against unemployed
workers (i.e., lower pu). In contrast, the following Proposition shows that if
hiring and …ring costs are low enough, discrimination would disappear.
PROPOSITION 6 -A s s u m e¹ m + ´H >w :There exists ¹ C; ¹ F>0 such
that if C · ¹ C and F · ¹ F;then in equilibrium pu =1 :
The property that ¹ m + ´H >wi m p l i e st h a ti ti sa tl e a s tp r o … t a b l ef o r
…rms to employ good workers in the best possible state, otherwise nobody is
ever hired and pu is indeterminate. Thus, Propositions 5 and 6 together tell
us that a large enough reduction in turnover costs would eliminate discrimi-
nation against unemployed workers, i.e. pu =1 (Figure 4).
4.2 Comparative Statics of Wages
The impact of turnover costs on the hiring rate of the unemployed contrasts
with that of recurrent labor costs, such as wages. An increase in wages
a l s os h i f t st h eE Bl o c u su p w a r d sa si tr e q u i r e sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ea v e r a g e
16quality of the unemployed. If the S-S locus did not move, then pu would
again fall. However, the …ring margins are also changed. The in‡ows into
unemployment increase. Proposition 7 shows that when the nonincreasing
hazards assumption holds, the in‡ow of good workers increases by more than
that of bad ones, which improves the quality of the unemployed.
PROPOSITION 7 - If the distribution G satis…es the nonincreasing
hazards property, then the S-S locus moves up when wages, w; increase.
Contrary to increases in turnover costs, wage increases raise the …ring
margins and, since the job loss rate is more sensitive for ‘good’ workers, the
quality of the unemployed improves. Figures 5.a and 5.b show how the hiring
rate of the unemployed changes when wages increase, under the assumption
of nonincreasing hazards. In this case, the relative job …nding rate of the
unemployed may either fall or rise. Higher wages make …rms more careful
at the time of hiring (i.e., EB shifts upwards), but also improve the pool of
the unemployed, thus reducing the need for discrimination (i.e., S-S shifts
upwards). The …rst e¤ect dominates if there is a substantial productivity
di¤erential between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ workers, which makes hiring behavior
more sensitive to labor costs (Figure 5.a). However, discrimination against
the unemployed may be reduced if S-S moves more than EB (Figure 5.b).
This may occur if the arrival rate of job opportunities is large, since a larger
a makes the composition of the stock of unemployment more sensitive to
the composition of its in‡ow. Thus, while greater hiring and …ring costs
unambiguously increase discrimination, the e¤ect of higher wages is ambigu-
ous. Therefore, our empirical analysis will focus on the impact of turnover
costs on the hiring probabilities of the unemployed relative to employed job
seekers.
5 Empirical Analysis of Unemployed-Employed
Di¤erences in Job Finding Probabilities
In this Section, we provide evidence that the ratio of job …nding probabilities
of unemployed workers relative to employed job seekers decreases as …ring
costs increase. This ratio is equal to the parameter pu in our model.10 In
10To be precise, the job …nding probability for an unemployed is apu and the job …nding
probability for an employed worker is a¼pe; where ¼ is the probability that an employed
worker seeks new employment and pe =1since …rms make strictly positive pro…ts out of
17Section 4, we showed that, discrimination disappears, i.e., pu = pe =1 ,f o r
low enough levels of hiring and …ring costs and that, under general conditions
about the distribution of the shocks, pu decreases as C and F increase.
In the empirical analysis below, we examine how discrimination responds
to increases in …rings costs. First, using U.S. data, we exploit the temporal
v a r i a t i o ni nj u s t - c a u s ed i s m i s s a ll e g i s l a t i o nt o g e t h e rw i t ht h ev a r i a t i o ni nt h e
strictness of the legislation across states to study how pu changed over the
1980’s with these changes in …ring costs. Second, using microdata for the
U.S. and Spain, the two OECD countries with the least and most strict job
security legislation, we compare pu between the two countries.
5.1 Reduced-form Speci…cation
In this section, we present a reduced form speci…cation that allows us to esti-
mate the relative job …nding rate of the unemployed and, more importantly,
to examine the change in this ratio as …ring costs increase.
In the discrete choice model we estimate below, the dependent variable
y takes the value of 1 if the person was successful in …nding a job within a
given time interval and the value of zero otherwise.11 In the model in Section
3, success in …nding a job depends on the contact rate (a), on the o¤er rate
(pu and pe for unemployed and employed workers, respectively), and on the
acceptance rate (which is simply equal to 1 in the model). According to the
model, thus, what generates di¤erences in job …nding rates between the two
groups is the di¤erence in the o¤er probabilities between the two groups, pe
and pu.12 Moreover, as explained in Section 3, …rms extend a job o¤er if the
expected pro…ts out of hiring an applicant are greater than or equal to the
hiring cost, and it does not make a job o¤er if the expected pro…ts fall below
the hiring cost:
y =
1i f EJs ¸ C:
0o t h e r w i s e .
hiring employed job seekers. Thus, the ratio of the job …nding probability of unemployed
workers over the job …nding probability of employed job seekers is
apu
a ; which is simply
the parameter pu.
11In the empirical analysis below, we consider transitions within yearly intervals.
12Of course, in reality there are also di¤erences in the contact rate and the acceptance
rate between unemployed workers and employed job seekers, which must be taken into
account. In the analysis below, thus, we control for a number of variables that a¤ect the
contact and the acceptance rates.
18Letting EJs ¡C be a continuous random variable, it can be expressed as
a linear function of a vector of explanatory variables, X, and an indicator
of whether the job applicant is unemployed, U, and a random term, v; i.e.,
EJs ¡ C = y¤ = ¯X + ±U + º: Then,
y =
1i f y¤ = ¯X + ±U + º ¸ 0;
0i f y¤ < 0:
Thus, if º is assumed to be normally distributed, the probability of …nding
aj o bi s ,
Pr(y =1 )=P r ( ¯X + ±U + º ¸ 0) = ©(¯X + ±U):
The vector of X0s includes individual characteristics a¤ecting the con-
tact rate, the o¤er rate, and the acceptance rate of workers, including: age,
education, occupation, industry, union status, tenure, gender, race, marital
status, number of children, the wage (wage in the current job for employed
job seekers and wage in the last job for the unemployed), and other income
of the household. In addition, the local unemployment rate and gross do-
mestic product are both included because they should a¤ect the contact rate.
The unemployment dummy is included because the model above tells us that
employment status should a¤ect the expected pro…ts out of a new hire and,
thus, the o¤er rate. In addition, employment status may also a¤ect the job
…nding rate if the unemployed search more intensively and/or have di¤erent
reservation wages than employed job seekers.13
Our model predicts that the o¤er rate to the unemployed should fall rela-
tive to the o¤er rate to employed job seekers as …ring costs rise. To examine
whether in fact …ring costs increase discrimination against the unemployed,
we include an interaction of the unemployment dummy with a job security
legislation dummy. Thus, we estimate the following speci…cation,
Pr(y =1 )=© ( ¯X + ±0U + ±1UxJSL);
where JSLis a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the unemployed per-
s o ni sp r o t e c t e db yj o bs e c u r i t yl e g i s l a t i o na n d0i ft h ep e r s o ni sn o tc o v e r e d
by job security legislation. We expect the coe¢cient on this interaction term
to be negative.
13Note, however, that we try to include as many factors as are available in the data to
control for di¤erences in contact rates and acceptance rates among individuals.
195.1.1 Sources of Variation in Firing Costs
We take two approaches to study the impact of …ring costs on the discrim-
ination of the unemployed. First, we exploit the varying strictness in job-
security provisions across states over the 1980’s in the United States. Second,
we combine microdata from the U.S. and Spain to compare the unemployed’s
relative job …nding rates between the two countries.
The rapid adoption of unjust dismissal legislation in di¤erent states in the
United States over the 1980’s implied a signi…cant increase in …ring costs for
…rms that had previously being subject to the employment-at-will doctrine.
According to Dertouzos and Karoly (1992), the employment-at-will doctrine
which was …rst introduced in the U.S. in 1895 determined that “when the
hiring is for an inde…nite period of time, the employment relationship can
be terminated at any time by either party for good cause, for bad cause or
for no cause at all.” This rule has dominated the employment relationship
in the U.S. since the end of the 19th century. However, the late 1970’s and
especially the 1980’s have witnessed a rapid increase in the introduction of
exceptions to this rule that imposed dismissal costs di¤erently across states.
Moreover, the timing in the introduction of these exceptions has varied widely
across states. While by 1979 only 20 states14 had introduced some sort of
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, today only 6 states15 are still
fully governed by the employment-at-will rule.
In addition, exceptions di¤er by whether the employee can recover com-
pensatory damages associated with the employment contract (Contract
Cause of Action) or with emotional distress (Tort Cause of Action). Since
Tort law is likely to impose a greater …ring cost on the employer, we dis-
tinguish between these two types of exceptions by including interactions of
the unemployment dummy with a Contract dummy and a Tort dummy. In
addition, we include a speci…cation that distinguishes among: Implied Con-
tract exceptions, Public-Policy exceptions, and Good Faith exceptions. The
Implied Contract exception determines that the “employment relationship
is governed by contractual provision that place restrictions on the ability of
the employer to terminate the employee under the employment-at-will rule.”
The Public-Policy exception instead prevents employers from terminating
14Including, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Ham-
phire, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington State, and
West Virginia.
15Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi.
20employees for refusing to commit unlawful acts. Finally, Good Faith ex-
ceptions rule that the covenant of good-faith and fair dealing must apply to
any employment relationship governed by a contract. Thus, in our empir-
ical analysis, we also distinguish among these di¤erent types of exceptions
by including interactions of the Implied Contract, Public-Policy, and Good
Faith dummies with the unemployment dummy.
In addition, we complement the analysis for U.S. states by using the large
variation in …ring costs between the U.S. and Spain, the two OECD coun-
tries with the lowest and highest …ring costs. According to ILO rankings,
the U.S.’s strictness is ranked at 0.4 and Spain’s is ranked at 3.0 (Garibaldi,
1998).16 Therefore, we should expect the di¤erence in the job …nding prob-
ability of the unemployed relative to employed job seekers to be greater in
Spain.17 We, thus, include an interaction term between the unemployment
dummy and a Spanish dummy which captures stricter job security legislation.
5.1.2 Robustness Checks
In the speci…cations presented above, it is possible that the unemployed
may have lower job …nding probabilities relative to employed job seekers for
reasons unrelated to …ring costs. This may certainly be the case if the unem-
ployed search less intensively or have higher reservation wages because of the
receipt of generous unemployment bene…ts. To control for this possibility,
we include an interaction term of the unemployment dummy with a dummy
indicating whether the unemployed person received unemployment bene…ts.
More fundamentally, our prediction is not on the relative job …nding proba-
bility of the unemployed, but on how this ratio responds to changes in …ring
costs. Thus, our test requires looking at the unemployment dummy inter-
acted with …ring costs rather than simply at the unemployment dummy.
It may be, however, that unemployed workers living in high …ring cost
states have lower job …nding probabilities because of factors present in these
states but unrelated to …ring costs. In order to control for this possibility,
we introduce state …xed-e¤ects in our speci…cations.
16Italy and Portugal, like Spain, are also ranked at 3.0.
17This di¤erence should be reduced, however, to the extent that …ring costs increased
in the U.S. with the introduction of the exceptions mentioned above and that …ring costs
fell in Spain with the introduction of temporary contracts.
215.2 Data Description
We use panel data for the U.S. and Spain to examine how the di¤erence in
the job …nding probability between unemployed and employed job seekers
responds to changes in …ring costs.
5.2.1 U.S. Data
The U.S. Data comes from the random sample of 6,111 individuals from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the years 1979-84 and
1996. These years are chosen because in these years employed workers were
asked about their job search activities. In particular, during these years
the NLSY asked currently employed workers whether they were looking for
another job. This data, thus, allows us to contrast employed and unemployed
job seekers.
Moreover, the NLSY’s work history …le allows us to track employer-
speci…c data and, thus, employment-to-employment switches can be correctly
identi…ed. For multiple job holders, the ‘main job’ was identi…ed as the job
in which the worker earned the most during that week. Moreover, we elimi-
nated from our sample all observations with a real wage less than one dollar
in 1979 dollars. Workers in the public sector and agriculture were also elim-
inated from the sample since we want to concentrate on workers employed
by pro…t-making …rms and subject to the exceptions described above when
applicable. Those serving in the military were also excluded from the sam-
ple. In addition, while the youngest person in the NLSY enters the sample
at 14, we restrict our sample to include workers 17 years of age or older.
The oldest workers reach age 39 in our sample period. Since observations
a r ed e … n e db ys e a r c hs p e l l so fe m p l o y e da n du n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r s ,a ni n d i -
vidual worker can contribute more than one observation if, for example, the
worker is unemployed during two or more sample years or if the worker is an
employed job seeker in one sample year and unemployed in another.18 For
this reason, in the estimations below we correct for heteroskedasticity and
we present robust standard errors.
Very importantly, we use the 1979 NLSY Geocode …le which was released
with special permission from the Bureau of Labor Statistics under their con-
18In our U.S. estimations, which control for all factors mentioned above, the sample is
restricted to 4,776, while in our joint U.S.-Spain estimations the U.S. sample has 10,172
observations.
22…dentiality policy. The Geocode …le is crucial to generate the job security
legislation dummies as it identi…es the state of residence of each individual
at the time of the interview. Moreover, the Geocode …le provides informa-
tion on the relevant local unemployment rate.19 In addition, we include an
aggregate measure of Gross Domestic Product obtained from the OECD’s
Main Economic Indicators, which is imputed for each of the years used in
order to control for aggregate trends.
Finally, the NLSY also includes detailed information about jobs including
the wage, union status, industry, occupation, and tenure in the current and
previous jobs. We use the information about the wage in the current and
previous job for employed job seekers and unemployed workers, respectively.
Finally, we include a measure of other household income which subtracts
the wage and unemployment bene…ts of the individual. Table 1 presents
descriptive characteristics for the U.S. sample.
5.2.2 Spanish Data
The Spanish data come from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (‘Encuesta
de Población Activa’) conducted every quarter on 60,000 households for six
consecutive quarters. The survey is a rotating panel which replaces one
sixth of the sample every quarter. Our sample corresponds to individuals
who entered between 1987:2 and 1995:4 and who remained in the sample a
year later. As in the NLSY, the Spanish Labor Force Survey asks currently
employed workers whether they were looking for a new job. Thus, we extract
data for those who are either unemployed or employed and currently looking
for another job. Moreover, since the Survey asks for tenure in the current
job, we can determine whether employed workers looking for another job
a year before switched jobs or stayed in the same job. As for the U.S.
sample, workers in the public sector and agriculture are eliminated, as well
as those serving in the military. Even dropping those in the public sector and
agriculture and those serving in the military, the Spanish sample has 64,211
observations.20 Since this sample is a lot larger than the U.S. sample, we
19The local unemployment rate is the unemployment rate in metropolitan statistical
areas for those living in these areas and the unemployment rate in the state (excluding
metropolitan statistical areas) for those living outside of them.
20For the joint U.S.-Spanish sample we are not able to include all of the explanatory
variables mentioned above, since the Spanish Labor Force Survey does not include infor-
mation on union status, wages, household income, and number of children for all of the
23keep a 20% random subsample.21 Table 2 reports descriptive characteristics
for this random sample.
5.3 Results
In this Section we …rst present the results from the U.S. sample alone, which
exploits the temporal and cross-section variation in …ring costs in the U.S.
over the 1980’s. Then, we present the results from the U.S.-Spain compari-
son, which exploits the di¤erence in …ring costs between the two countries.
5.3.1 Exceptions to Employment-at-will in the U.S.
Table 3 presents the results of the reduced-form model for the U.S.. Column
(1) shows the results for the baseline speci…cation that includes the Contract
and Tort law distinction, while Column (2) shows the results of the spec-
i…cation with the distinction among Implicit Contract, Public-Policy, and
Good Faith doctrines. Column (1) shows that unemployed workers living
in Contract and Tort law states have a harder time …nding employment rel-
ative to employed job seekers. In particular, unemployed workers living in
Contract law states are 5.1% less likely to …nd employment relative to em-
ployed job seekers compared to unemployed workers living in states without
exceptions (p-value 2.7). This number is 1.3 % for Tort Law States, so that
together these two exceptions reduce the unemployed’s relative exit rate by
6.4 % (p-value 5.1). Similarly, the cumulative e¤ect of the Implicit Contract,
Public-Policy and Good Faith doctrines on pu is -7.9% (p-value 3.5).
Columns (3) and (4) show the results for the Contract-Tort law distinction
and the distinction among doctrines, respectively, but now allowing for un-
employment bene…ts to a¤ect the job …nding probability of the unemployed.
As expected, the unemployed who receive unemployment bene…ts have a
lower probability of …nding jobs, but the e¤ect is only marginally signi…cant.
More importantly, the e¤ect of exceptions on discrimination remains very
similar. Column (3) shows that unemployed workers in states covered by
Contract and Tort law are 6.3% less likely to …nd jobs than employed workers
compared to the unemployed in employment-at-will states (p-value 6.4). The
corresponding …gure when all doctrines apply is 7.7% (p-value 4.6).
survey years used.
21The Spanish random subsample has 9,628 observations with information on all of the
variables needed to estimate the discrete choice model.
24Finally, in Table 4 we control for state …xed-e¤ects. This strengthens our
results. The e¤ect of employment protection on pu is now -5.5 % for Contract
law and -4.6 % for Tort law, so that their cumulated e¤ect is -10.1% (p-value
1.75). Column (2) in Table 4 shows that the Implied Contract, Public Policy
and Good Faith doctrines reduce the unemployed’s job …nding rate by 8.7 %,
1.6 % and 1.4 %, respectively, suggesting that the three doctrines together
reduce the unemployed’s relative exit rate by 12.8% (p-value 0.7).
To summarize, our results indicate that the unemployed found it increas-
ingly hard to …nd employment relative to employed workers over the 1980’s
in the U.S. in those states that introduced exceptions to the employment-
at-will doctrine. The results, thus, suggest that discrimination against the
unemployed increased in the U.S. as …ring costs increased during the 1980’s.
5.3.2 U.S.-Spain Comparison
Table 5 presents the results from the combined samples for the U.S. and
Spain. Column (1) presents the results for the baseline model including all
those variables which can be controlled for and a country …xed-e¤ect. The re-
sults indicate that unemployed workers in Spain are 13.5% less likely to …nd
a job relative to employed job seekers compared to American unemployed
workers (p-value 0). Column (2) shows similar results but controlling for
the possibility that unemployed workers are less likely to …nd a job simply
because they receive unemployment bene…ts. The estimated e¤ect of em-
ployment protection on pu remains virtually unchanged (-13.6%). Finally,
since unemployment bene…ts are more generous in Spain, in Column (3) we
allow for unemployment bene…ts to have a di¤erent e¤ect on Spanish and
American workers. This actually further widens the estimated gap, now
equal to 14.1 % (p-value 0).22 This evidence, thus, suggests that the unem-
ployed are discriminated more in Spain than in the U.S., the two countries
with the most and least strict job security provisions.
22Althougth the ratio of job …nding probabilities of unemployed to employed job seekers
is signi…cantly lower in Spain than in the U.S., this di¤erence is likely to be mitigated by
the extensive use of temporary contracts in Spain which allow …rms to reduce …ring costs.
256C o n c l u s i o n
The matching model with asymmetric information presented in this paper
shows that, under general assumptions about the distribution of the shocks,
hiring and …ring costs exacerbate the discrimination against the unemployed
when there is adverse selection in the labor market. In contrast, wage in-
creases may increase or reduce the discrimination against the unemployed.
Our model, thus, predicts that employment-to-employment turnover should
be large relative to unemployment turnover in states with high hiring and
…ring costs. Evidence from microdata for Spain and the U.S. shows that the
job …nding probability of the unemployed relative to employed job seekers,
our inverse measure of discrimination of the unemployed, was lower in Spain
than in the U.S.. Moreover, we …nd that the discrimination of the unem-
ployed increased in the U.S. over the 1980’s in those states that raised …ring
costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.
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29Appendix A: Theoretical Appendix
A.1. Proofs of Propositions
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 - The RHS of equation (3) is increas-
ing in the …ring margin mc(´); so that equation (3) determines mc uniquely.
Di¤erentiating the RHS of equation (3) with respect to the …ring margin,
mc(´); we get r+¼a+°G(mc(´)) > 0: Di¤erentiating, then, with respect to




(r + ¼a+ °)(r + ¼a)





(r + ¼a+ °)¼a





(r + ¼a+ °)





This proves the signs of the derivatives. Furthermore, given that dmc
d´ < 0
and, thus, mc(´H) <m c(´L); the denominators are greater for ´ = ´L than
for ´ = ´H; which proves that there is a greater response of mc(´H) to changes
in F;C; and w than of mc(´L): Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 - ¦u c a nb ew r i t t e na saf u n c t i o no f
zu and the exogenous parameters of the model. J(m;´) can be computed
by substituting equation (2) into equation (1), and it only depends on mc(´)
and on exogenous parameters. Given that mc(´) is a sole function of such
parameters, ¦u can be written as a function of zu and exogenous parameters,
¦u = zuJ(¹ m;´H)+( 1¡ zu)J(¹ m;´L)
= zu[
(¹ m + ´H ¡ w + ¼aC)




mc(´) (m0 + ´H ¡ w + ¼aC)g(m0)dm0
(r + ¼a+ °)(r + ¼a+ °G(mc(´H))
¡
°FG(mc(´H))
(r + ¼a+ °G(mc(´H))
]
+(1 ¡ zu)[
(¹ m + ´L ¡ w + ¼aC)




mc(´) (m0 + ´L ¡ w + ¼aC)g(m0)dm0
(r + ¼a+ °)(r + ¼a+ °G(mc(´L))
¡
°FG(mc(´L))
(r + ¼a+ °G(mc(´L))
] (11)
30Furthermore, @¦u
@zu = J(¹ m;´H) ¡ J(¹ m;´L) > 0: Therefore, in regime 2
there exists a unique value of zu such that the condition ¦u = C is matched.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 - Totally di¤erentiating the expression
¦u = C from Proposition 2, we obtain that the derivatives of the second and
third terms in the brackets with respect to mc(´) cancel each other out.






















(r+¼a+°G(mc(´H)) +( 1¡ zu) 1
(r+¼a+°G(mc(´L))
i








(r+¼a+°G(mc(´H)) +( 1¡ zu) 1
(r+¼a+°G(mc(´L))
i
(J(¹ m;´H) ¡ J(¹ m;´L))
> 0: Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 - Di¤erentiating equation (11) with













which is negative since GH <G L: Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5 - Di¤erentiating equation (10), while
holding pu constant, we …nd that the direction of the move of the S-S locus







































































@C : Thus, given that GL >G H and the nonincreasing hazards assump-
tion, @zu
@F and @zu
@C are clearly negative. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6 -A tC = F =0 ; One has J(¹ m;´H) >
¡F =0=C and J(¹ m;´L) ¸¡ F =0=C; implying ¦e > 0=C for all ze:23
Therefore one is always in Regime 1. By continuity, this property holds in
the neighborhood of ¹ C = ¹ F =0 : Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7 - Di¤erentiating equation (10), while
holding pu constant, we …nd that the direction of the shift of the S-S locus




































@w > 0: Thus, given that
GL >G H and the nonincreasing hazards assumption, @zu
@w is clearly positive.
Q.E.D.
23Equation (1) was derived in the case where J(m;´) ¸¡ F: If applying equation (1)
yields a value lower than ¡F; then J(m;´)=¡F:
32A.2. The EB and S-S Curves































34Figure 3: Comparative Statics of













Figure 4: Comparative Statics of
Reductions in C and F








































36Appendix B: Empirical Appendix






Age 16-19 Years 27.22
Age 20-34 Years 68.06
Age > 35 Years 4.72
Years of Education 12.0819 (1.9401)
Elementary Education 4.03








Tenure in Weeks 40.0435 (25.8064)
Real Weekly Wage 520.7971 (474.9081)
Other Household Income 16,183.97 (25,438.35)
Unemployed 41.47
Local Unemployment Rate 8.8118 (3.5994)
GDP 9,711,181 (131,000,000)
Covered by Contract Law 40.37
Covered by Tort Law 43.03
C o v e r e db yI m p l i c i tC o n t r a c tD o c t r i n e 35.71
Covered by Public-Policy Doctrine 49.23
Covered by Good-Faith Doctrine 16.59
37Table 2: Descriptive Statistics from the
Spanish Labor Force Survey
Variable Proportion
Age 16-19 Years 9.03
Age 20-34 Years 35.01
Age > 35 Years 55.96
Elementary Education 53.54







38Table 3: Job Finding Probabilities in the U.S.24























































































































Log-Likelihood -2,629.77 -2,628.19 -2,628.32 -2,626.82
24The reported probits also include: a white dummy, other race dummy, number of
children, union status, tenure, wage, other income, and GDP. The sample size is 4,776.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ¤ denotes signi…cance at the 1% level, ¤¤ denotes
signi…cance at the 5% level, and y denotes signi…cance at the 10% level.











































































25The reported probits also include: a white dummy, other race dummy, number of
children, union status, tenure, wage, other income, and GDP. The sample size is 4,773.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ¤ denotes signi…cance at the 1% level, ¤¤ denotes
signi…cance at the 5% level, and y denotes signi…cance at the 10% level.
40Table 5: U.S.-Spain Comparison of Job Finding Probabilities26
























































































UI Bene…ts x Spain
0.0184
(0.0181)
Log-Likelihood -11,578.49 -11,572.24 -11,571.79
26The sample size is 19,790. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ¤ denotes sig-
ni…cance at the 1% level, ¤¤ denotes signi…cance at the 5% level, and y denotes signi…cance
at the 10% level.
41